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I would like thank Vicki Hesli and Holley Hansen for helpful comments and insights.   It is prominently argued in the international relations literature that governments 
join international organizations only when they know they can comply easily with the 
requirements of membership (Downs et al 1996).  Similarly, Jana Von Stein (2005) 
argues that states compliance with IMF Article VIII is driven by the same unobservable 
factors that led them to sign in the first place.  That is, Von Stein found that being an 
Article VIII signatory had no independent effect on state behavior.  This model is 
intriguing in that it suggests that incentives that drive prospective member states’ 
decisions to join an international agreement are also what drive them to comply with that 
agreement.  Applying the Von Stein approach to EU expansion, we would expect only 
those member states that could easily comply with EU demands in the first place to sign 
Accession Treaties.  That is, we would expect expansion only among wealthy, post-
industrial democracies of long standing.  An EU that expanded along these lines would 
readily absorb the likes of Austria, Finland and Sweden but would have deterred most of 
the 10 member states of the 2004 expansion. 
There may be reason to believe that the EU would be an exception to this argument.  
In addition to access to a market of over 400 million consumers, the EU offers enormous 
selective benefits to its members in the form of subsidies through the Common 
Agricultural Policy and Cohesion Funds.  These benefits are particularly tempting to the 
relatively poor and agrarian member states that have joined in 2004 and since.  However, 
while the benefits attached to membership are large, so too are the costs.  New member 
states must adopt the Acquis Communitaire, the body of laws and regulations already in 
force in the EU.  Furthermore, new member states must also conform to the ideals laid 
out Article 6(1) of the Treaty and elaborated upon in the Copenhagen Criteria.  These 
  1require respect for human rights and stable democratic instituations.  Despite the daunting 
costs of membership, the EU has added 12 new members since 2004 and several other 
countries have applied for membership as well.  All of these recently joined states and the 
applicant states are poorer and more agrarian than the average EU member state.   
If the demands of membership are high and the capacity of the new member states 
to meet those demands is low, why is the EU expanding so rapidly?  Several factors 
contribute to this observation.  This article focuses on the one set of institutional features 
that lead initially high demands that diminish over time.  I argue that because of the 
varying effects of supermajoritarian voting requirements in combination with different 
agenda setters the demands of joining are high but that the demands of staying in are 
lower.  Furthermore, as the EU expands the difference between initial demands for 
joining and long-term demands of membership will not diminish and will probably 
increase.  That is there is a built in double standard with candidate members held to very 
high standards and existing member states allowed to backslide. 
Using a series of simple spatial models, I show that increasing the number of 
member states will not only increase the size of the core
1 but can also shift it in the 
direction of the new member states.
2  Furthermore, I model the enforcement mechanism 
for the human rights standards set forth in Article 6(1) of the Treaty.  This enforcement 
mechanism depends on a unanimous vote in favor of sanctioning a member state.  From 
these models, I derive a number of implications.  In particular, I argue that the possibility 
                                                 
1 The core is the set of possible policies that cannot be defeated by any alternative policy under a given 
voting rule. 
2 Tsebelis and Yataganas (2001) already demonstrated that the core will expand as the EU membership 
increases.  They argued that increasing the size of the core would increase the discretion of the Commission 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  However, they did not examine the possibility of the core 
shifting as well.  Furthermore, they did not examine the implications such changes in the core would have 
for policy implementation within the EU.   
  2of member states to undo reforms they had to implement to join the EU, that is 
“backslide,” does not decrease and will likely increase with expansion.  New member 
states’ ability to backslide is greatest when there are other members states with similar 
incentives to undo reforms on that dimension.  A new member state’s ability to backslide 
is at its lowest when the new member state is an outlier relative to the rest of the 
members.  Finally, the possibility for backsliding is greater with regard to Article 6(1) 
than for the regulatory policies encompassed in the Aquis.   
 
Current Literature  
Europeanization literature 
There is a wide literature on Europeanization, the process by which member states 
adapt to EU membership and through which their policies converge.  Much of this 
literature examines the changes taking place in single cases (Cole 2001; Cole and Drake 
2000; Lavdas, 1997; Montepetit 2000; Paraskevapolous 2001).  However, there have 
been some comparisons of small numbers of cases or cross-national studies examining 
the entire EU (Börzel, 2001; Cowles et al, 2001; Grabbe, 2006; Knill, 2001; Pedersen, 
2006).  This literature generally views Europeanization as unidirectional.  That is, all 
member states are moving towards adaptation to the EU’s standards albeit at different 
rates.  The emphasis of most of this literature has been on those domestic characteristics 
that explain why some member states adapt faster than others.  For example, Knill and 
Lemkuhl (2002) examined the role that different EU level mechanisms influenced the 
member states.  They argue that the degree of misfit between the EU and the member 
state’s institutions involved in a given policy area drive the pace of Europeanization for 
  3that member state.  While the interaction between the domestic politics of the members 
states and the EU is a rich source of insight for EU scholars, this approach has omitted an 
important possibility.  This literature has not considered the possibility that the 
Europeanization process could be reversed. 
 
Expansion’s effect on EU decisions 
Tsebelis and Yataganas (2001) examined the impact that the Treaty of Nice and the 
2004 expansion would have on the decision-making institutions of the EU.  In particular, 
they demonstrated that policy stability in the Council of Ministers would increase.  That 
is, they showed that the core would expand.  The reason for this expansion was the 
change in the voting rule from roughly 5/7 of the weighted votes in the Council to a more 
restrictive double majority in which both the weighted votes of the Council and the 
population represented by the member states would be taken into account.  They further 
argue that as a consequence of the expanding core within the Council, the Commission 
and Court will have increased discretion with respect the interpretation and 
implementation of existing legislation.  The Council can overrule actions by the 
Commission and the Court.  However, when the increasing size of the core restricts the 
Council’s ability to make decisions is restricted it also restricts the ability to overrule the 
Commission and the Court.   
Similar arguments are put forward in Pahre and Ucaray (2007).  They argue that 
fears about Turkish influence on the EU after it joins are unfounded because it’s 
influence will be limited to cooperating with other member states to block decisions.  
They argue that Turkey will not be able to drive the agenda and so should not be seen as 
  4a potential source of radical change within the EU.  In essence, they are arguing that 
Turkish admission to the EU will only increase the size of the core and as such can only 
increase policy stability.   
Neither of these works have examined the possibility the core could shift position in 
the issue space as well as expand.  However, König and Bräuninger (2004) argue that the 
2004 expansion to the East and South ran a risk of allowing dramatic redistribution of 
resources within the EU.  In their analysis of agricultural policy in the post-expansion 
EU, they argue that the newest 10 member states have similar preferences to each other 
and are different as a group from the older 15.  They argue that the position of the core 
can shift.  In response, they argue that the EU instituted the triple majority voting to 
expand the core to such an extent that despite the change in position, the pre-expansion 
status quo would be stabilized. 
However, none of these works examines the effects that an expanding and shifting 
core would have on prospective and current member states.  I build on their research by 
beginning with an analysis of the decision-making rules in the Council of Ministers.  In 
particular, I concentrate on the supermajoritarian voting requirements.  I will examine the 
effect additional member states can have on both the size and position of the core and 
discuss the consequences of these effects on the ability of member states to back away 
from some of the changes they undertook to join the EU in the first place.  
 
Article 6 and the Copenhagen Criteria 
  5Title I, Article 6 of the Treaty establishes the EU as a democratic organization and 
requires the member states to adhere to basic standards of democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law.   
Article 6 (1) The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States. (Consolidated Versions 
of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community: 12) 
 
This article establishes the minimum standards of democracy that the member 
states will be expected to meet.  Failure to meet these standards places a member 
state in danger of having their membership suspended under the terms of Article 7 
discussed below.  Leaving aside the voting rules involved in impose suspension 
under Article 7, the standards imposed by Article 6 are both broad and basic.  
Essentially, member states are required to be generally democratic.   
At the European Council Meeting in Copenhagen in 1993, the member states 
established a series of criteria by which prospective member states would be judged as 
they applied for membership.  The Copenhagen Criteria for accession reinforce article 6 
with regard to enlargement.  Indeed, the Copenhagen Criteria are a higher bar than 
Aritcle 6.  The Copenhagen Criteria include political, economic and legal aspects.  
Prospective member states must guarantee democracy, the rule of law and respect for 
minorities.  Prospective member states must have functioning market economies.  
Finally, prospective member states must adopt the Acquis Communautaire, the body of 
law already in force in the EU.  The inclusion of the Acquis Communautaire goes well 
beyond the basic standards of democracy and human rights established in Article 6.  The 
  6requirements established by the Copenhagen Criteria are more specific and require more 
government action to comply with than those in Article 6. 
The difference between these two standards may reflect the different 
supermajaritarian voting requirements for internal matters versus accession.  Features of 
EU law designed to be binding on the existing member states require a qualified majority 
vote in the case of individual laws and a unanimous vote in the case of treaties.  Subject 
to additional variables such as log rolls and the lobbying influence of interest groups and 
national parliaments (König and Slapin 2004), text in the treaty must receive the approval 
of the member state government that is most skeptical about deepening integration.  In 
contrast, the accession criteria that are imposed on prospective member states reflect the 
preferences of the most demanding member state.  The result is that the demands placed 
on prospective member states are more specific and difficult to meet than the demands 
placed on existing member states.  This double standard is built into the institutional 
structures of the EU.  The supermajoritarian voting rules that protect existing member 
states from onerous burdens simultaneously imposes high demands on prospective 
members.  The next section of this paper explores those supermajoritarian voting 
requirements in detail. 
 
Supermajortarian voting rules in the EU 
Accession 
When member states are candidate states, any existing member state government 
can veto their accession to the EU according to Article 49.  Because of this unanimity 
requirement, candidate state governments must satisfy the most demanding existing 
  7member state.  It is important to note that the candidate state may actually surpass some 
member states in meeting EU mandates and still not win unanimous support for 
admission.  This has lead to the argument that the accession process places great pressure 
on the prospective member states through “conditionality” (Grabbe 2002, 2006; Brücker 
et al 2004; Hughes et al 2004; Barnes and Randerson 2006).  Indeed, the accession of a 
number of current member states was delayed at some point during the process in order 
to encourage more progress on democratic reforms.  Spain, Bulgaria and Romania all saw 
their accession delayed by years.  Slovakia was threatened with such a delay.  These 
delays are evidence in support of the concept of conditionality.   
However, the research on the efficacy of conditionality has produced mixed results.  
Conditionality does not seem to hold firm across policy areas or across time.  Barnes and 
Randerson (2006) argued that conditionality has failed in some cases where member 
states rolled back reforms.  The current literature on conditionality sees these delays and 
reversals in the context of bargaining between the EU (especially the Commission) and 
the prospective member states (Brücker et al 2004; Barnes and Randerson 2006).  Such 
an explanation does not directly address the consequences of the decision-making rules 
that constrain such bargaining.  I contend that the explanation for this observed potential 
to reverse reforms lies in the supermajoritarian voting rules involved in enforcing EU 
policy standards on the full fledged member states.  These supermajoritarian 
requirements apply both to the ability of the member states to constrain the Commission 
and ECJ’s efforts to ensure consistent implementation of EU law and the enforcement of 
Article 6. 
The Commission the ECJ and the implementation of policy 
  8The EU passes enormous amounts of regulation and legislation.  The acquis 
communautaire is the sum of all those laws.  While the EU’s institutions can produce 
these laws they cannot enforce them themselves.  The EU depends instead on the member 
state governments to implement these laws.  The Commission can initiated cases which 
are ultimately ruled upon by the ECJ.  However, this is not to say that the Commission 
and the ECJ have unrestricted ability to interpret and enforce EU law.  The Council of 
Ministers can overrule the rulings of the ECJ through legislation (Garret et al 1998; 
Kilroy 1999). The council’s own supermajoritarian voting requirements constrain its 
ability to reverse ECJ rulings.
3   
When the Commission and ECJ establish one interpretation of how EU law should 
be implemented, the Council can overrule that interpretation.  However, the Commission 
and ECJ’s position can be defended by a blocking minority of the member states on the 
Council.  Tsebelis and Yataganas (2001) pointed out that the Treaty of Nice changed the 
voting rules by imposing the complicated triple majority.  The triple majority requires 
that a wining qualified majority represent 255 of the 345 votes available as well as 
representing 62% of the population of the EU.  This change makes achieving a blocking 
minority easier in terms of the percentage of the total votes cast.  That is the core 
expands.  Figure 1 shows this effect on a single dimension.  Prior to the Treaty of Nice 
the qualified majority voting requirement was set at approximately 5/7 of the total votes 
on the Council.  Tsebelis and Yataganas (2001) argue that the effect of expanding this 
core will be to increase the autonomy of the Commission and the ECJ with regard to the 
interpretation and enforcement of EU policy.  However, this does not take into account 
                                                 
3 The European Parliament also plays a role in legislation under the codecision procedure.  In this paper I 
focus on the Council’s voting rules as the primary limiting factor.  For a more detailed examination of the 
role of the European Parliament in legislation see Tsebelis 1994; Tsebelis et al 2001. 
  9the position of the new core relative to the old core and the preferences of the 
Commission and the ECJ. 
Figure 1 represents an expanding EU with a Commission and ECJ that prefer 
deeper integration and stricter enforcement of EU policy than any single member state 
government.  For this figure, I use points A through N to represent the ideal points of 
member states.  Points A through G represent the pre-expansion EU.  Points H through N 
represent the member states that joined during the expansion.  The number of members 
does not correspond to the 27 member states currently in the EU.  The number reflects 
the voting rules I will discuss which are approximated as 5/7, following Tsebelis and 
Yataganas (2001).  I model the pre-expansion EU as a 7 member Union and the post 
expansion EU as a 14 member Union. 
I make two assumptions about the positions of the ideal points.  First, I make the 
standard assumption that the Commission and ECJ have similar preferences to each other 
and that their ideal point represents greater integration and stricter enforcement than any 
member state.  This assumption probably also holds on other policy dimensions.  Past 
research has shown that EU policies tend to increase the level of regulatory enforcement 
beyond that in any member state, including the most heavily regulated.  Research on EU 
legislation has identified the agenda control Commission and the European Parliament 
(EP) as the sources of this increase (Tsebelis and Kalandrakis 1999; Tsebelis et al 2001).  
Research has shown that the ECJ is an engine for increasing the scope of EU policy and 
the strictness with which it is enforced, especially when the Council is less capable of 
overriding its rulings (Garret et al 1998; Kilroy 1999; Stone-Sweet and Brunell 1998; 
  10Tsebelis and Garrett 2001).  I believe it is justified to place the Commission and ECJ at 
the far left end of the dimension in the figure.   
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Second, I assume that the expansion member states (H through N) have ideal points 
that are all outside the range of the previous membership and are all on the same side of 
that range.  That is expansion pulls the range of the membership to the right on the 
dimension depicted in the figure.  There are several reasons to believe that the newest 
member states will be outside the range of the old membership.  Table 1 shows a 
selection of indicators that show that the 12 Central and Eastern European members are 
poorer and more agrarian than the 15 pre-expansion member states.  Furthermore, the 
newest members have much more recent transitions to democracy, have less stable party 
systems, and may rely on their less expensive labor and lower production costs to 
compete in the European and global market place.   
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
To identify the core in this figure, I first identify the voting rule.  In the case of the 
5/7 voting rule, I counted 5 member states in from far left (member state A) and five 
member states in from the far right (member state G pre-expansion, member state N post-
expansion).  The zone between those two points contains the policies that cannot be 
overruled by a 5/7 vote of those member states.  Figure 1 shows that even when the 
voting rule is changed from 5/7 to 6/7, expanding the EU can expand the core without 
changing the Commission’s ability to establish the interpretation of EU law through the 
infringement process.   
  11In the case of the 5/7 core prior to expansion, the Commission will establish the 
standards for implementation of EU policy at point C.   C is the point within the core that 
is closest to the Commission’s and ECJ’s ideal point.  However, if the voting rule is 
changed from 5/7 to 6/7 the core dramatically expands.  This much is shown in Tsebelis 
and Yataganas (2001).  However, by reasonably assuming that the newer member states 
are outside the range of the older membership, the effect of that expanding core can be 
shown.  After expansion, and with a higher voting threshold approximated at 6/7, the 
Commission and ECJ still establish the standards for implementation of EU law at point 
C.  C is still the point closest to the Commission’s and ECJ’s most prefered point that is 
still within the core.  Notice that despite the fact that the core has expanded, it has not 
changed the policy position that the Commission and ECJ will establish.  This is the 
primary argument put forward by König and Bräuninger (2004). 
The situation becomes even more interesting when examining what happens if the 
voting rule does not change.  If the EU expands and the voting rule remains at 5/7, the 
core expands.  Prior to expansion, the core spans points C through E.  After expansion, 
the core spans points E through J.  However, not only has the core expanded in size, it 
has shifted dramatically to the right.  Under this new situation, the Commission and ECJ 
will establish the standards for implementation at point E.  Even though the Commission 
and ECJ have greater flexibility as indicated by the expanded core, the position of their 
ideal points relative to the new location of that core can actually decrease their influence 
over EU policy.  The triple majority requirement imposed by the Treaty of Nice is not 
likely to be as great as the change from 5/7 to 6/7.  Neither will it represent no change at 
all.  The reality will likely be in between these two models.  Nevertheless, it is possible 
  12that the point that the Commission and the ECJ are able to establish as the standard for 
implementing EU policy will shift away from their ideal point.   
 
Implication 1a:  As the EU expands, the Commission and the ECJ will not be more 
aggressive and may be less aggressive in pushing a pro-integration agenda.  
 
A further implication of this analysis is that some member states that had been 
subjected to infringement proceedings for attempting to implement policies at their own 
ideal points will be immune to such proceedings after expansion.  Without changing their 
policies, a member state government may see the range of permissible policies expand to 
include its ideal point.  On figure 1, that range of permissible policies would the points on 
the line between the core and the Commission and ECJ’s ideal point.  Member state 
governments can reap the benefits of this newfound flexibility without actually engaging 
in backsliding per se.  In short, member states may be able to see their infringement 
burden reduced without having to make any substantive policy changes one way or the 
other.   
 
Implication 1b:  As the EU expands, existing member states that had had difficulty 
with frequent infringements may see those difficulties decrease without having to 
make any substantive changes to their policies.  
 
Furthermore, older member states may be able to take advantage of the expansion 
to reverse some of the policy changes they made to comply with past ECJ rulings.  
  13Expansion may allow long-standing member states to backslide.  Of course, this analysis 
does not take into account the domestic political situation.  Domestic interests may resist 
the attempt to backslide and defend the old EU standard.  Conflicting domestic interests 
may increase the costs of domestic changes to the point where backsliding is impossible.  
However, when the costs of maintaining the old EU standard are very high, the incentive 
to backslide may win out.  Similarly, when the domestic costs of change are low (for 
example in a country with a single party government), the incentives to backslide may 
win out.  It is reasonable to expect that in situations where the political costs of 
maintaining the old EU standard are high and/or where the number of domestic veto 
players is low, backsliding will be possible. 
 
Implication 1c:  As the EU expands, member states for which the political costs of 
maintaining the old EU standard are high and/or the domestic costs of policy 
change are low, may reverse or scale back some EU mandated reforms. 
 
Poland may provide an early example.  Prior to joining the EU, Poland opened up 
their largely state owned banking sector to competition from foreign banks as well as 
purchase of some Polish Banks by larger banks from EU member states.  The 
liberalization of the Polish banking sector was part of the over all transition to a market 
economy that was required as part of Poland’s accession process.  Pre-accession Polish 
governments approved sales of state own Polish banks to Italian and German banks.  In 
particular, the Polish government approved the sale of the Polish Pekao to Italian 
UniCredit in 1999. Since accession however, the Polish government has begun to reassert 
  14a protectionist position with regard to banking liberalization.  When UniCredit announced 
a merger with the German Bayrische Hypo- und Vereinsbank, the Polish government 
intervened.  The German bank also owned branches in Poland and the newly elected 
Polish government, led by the populist and euro-skeptical Law and Justice Party, argued 
that the merger violated the non-competition clause in the original UniCredit purchase of 
Pekao in 1999.  Many observers also pointed out that new merger would have made the 
newly combined Polish subsidiaries larger than the still state owned PKO Bank Polski.  
The Polish government ordered UniCredit to sell off its shares of Pekao before the 
merger took place.   
The Polish government’s blocking of the merger occurred despite approval by the 
Commission acting in their capacity as the primary anti-trust regulator for cross-border 
mergers.  The Commission argued that the Polish government had no authority to 
interfere with the merger and initiated two infringement proceedings against Poland for 
this action (IP 06 276; IP 06 277).  The infringements argued that Poland was violating 
Articles 43 and 56 of the Treaty and Article 21 of the EC Merger Regulation (IP 06 276; 
IP 06 277).  Article 43 prohibits using cooperative agreements between members to 
restrict trade within the community.  Article 56 prohibits restrictions on the movement of 
capital between the member states.  Article 21 of the EC Merger Regulation gives the 
Commission exclusive authority to regulate cross border mergers and prohibits member 
states from applying national anti-trust laws to cross border mergers. 
In April of 2006, the Polish government approved a compromise with UniCredit 
under which UniCredit would agree to sell over 40% of the affected branches and pledge 
not to lay off any employees of either Polish subsidiary for a period of two years 
  15(International Herald Tribune 4/6/07).  The Commission has not withdrawn the 
infringement cases. The nature of the rulings, should the Commission refer the cases to 
the ECJ, will establish a new implementation position for banking, capital mobility and 
anti-trust regulation in the EU.    
 
Article 7, democracy and human rights 
ECJ rulings and the infringement procedure are the primary methods by which the 
EU imposes policy standards on the member state governments.  However, the penalties 
imposed on the member states are often quite low.  At the same time, infringement case 
rulings often have limited scope.  The result is that member states may be willing to incur 
repeated infringement case losses rather than pay the domestic political costs involved in 
complying with the EU standards from the start.  Nevertheless, there is a theoretical limit 
to the ability of EU member states to flout the law.  In cases where a member state has 
committed a gross violation of the treaty, most especially in the areas outlined in Article 
6 above, the Council may suspend the membership rights of that country.  Article 7 
provides for the suspension of membership rights and lays out the procedure and voting 
rules that must be undertaken.  This is the only mechanism available in the EU that 
approaches the level of sanction that can be imposed on a candidate member state.   
However, Article 7 requires a series of votes before the Council can suspend a 
member state’s rights of membership.  The first stage in the process resembles an 
indictment.  In this stage a third of the member state governments, the EP or the 
Commission may issue a reasoned proposal identifying the transgression to be subjected 
to an Article 7 ruling by the Council.  This proposal must state that “there is a clear risk 
  16of a serious breach by a Member State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1), and 
address appropriate recommendations to that State” (Consolidated Versions of the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community: 12).  Because 
one third of the Council and the EP are both collective actors in which disagreements 
about the clarity of the risk or the severity of the breach may prevent initiation, such a 
proposal is most likely to come from the Commission.  The next step of the process 
requires the Council hear a defense by the member state in question.  Following that 
process, the Council must vote by a 4/5 qualified majority of the member state 
governments (not weighted votes) and obtain the assent of the EP.  This vote establishes 
that there is indeed serious risk of a breach of Article 6(1).   
Once the risk of a breach has been identified, the Council votes on whether such a 
breach has actually occurred.  This vote is a unanimous vote of the governments (not 
including the government being judged).  The final vote requires qualified majority in 
support of punishing the wayward member state.  The most difficult vote to achieve in 
this series of votes is the unanimous vote determining that a breach has occurred.  The 
result is that if a member state has committed acts that the Commission, a majority of the 
EP or a third of the other member state governments considers a violation of Article 6(1), 
it may still avoid suspension of membership rights if only one other member state 
government is willing to defend their position.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Figure 2 shows the core under Article 7 for the pre-expansion and post-expansion 
Council.  The core is defined by the member state that is most tolerate of deviations from 
the principles set down in Article 6(1) other than the one subject to the judgment of 
  17Article 7.  That member state will be pivotal in any discussion of whether to impose a 
suspension of membership rights.  In Figure 2, the core spans the range from member B 
through member F before expansion and from member B through member M after 
expansion.  In this situation, expanding the membership dramatically expands the core.  
However, because of the unanimity requirement embedded in Article 7, the core does not 
shift to the right.   
The implications of this core expansion, however, differ from the implications with 
regard to the infringement procedure and ECJ rulings.  In the situation discussed above, 
the Commission and ECJ are the institutions that select the point within the core that will 
be the established EU standard for implementation.  By using that agenda setting power, 
they can minimize the amount of backsliding allowed even by a shifting core.  However, 
with regard to the procedures outlined in Article 7, the wayward member state effectively 
picks the position within the core that will establish the EU standard.   
Despite this change in the agenda-setting role with regard to Article 7, courts may 
still have the ability to exercise their autonomy when making rulings.  That is, while the 
Council cannot impose sanctions on member states, the ECJ can make rulings.  The ECJ 
also has the ability to rule on matters of concern under Article 6(1) to the extent that 
violation of Article 6(1) is a violation of the Treaties.  However, the rulings of the ECJ 
are subject to the conditions discussed above.  The Council can overrule the ECJ by 
QMV. 
Because of this difference between what the ECJ can establish as a ruling and what 
the Council can impose through Article 7, the ECJ can play a role by ruling against 
certain of the member states repeatedly.  However, only the ECJ will act against them.  
  18These member states could develop long lists of rulings against them for failure to meet 
EU standards on human rights, the rule of law etc.   However, their membership rights 
will be protected by the voting rules in Article 7.  In effect, a new class of scofflaw 
member states could emerge.  There are member states that incur more than their shares 
of the infringement cases, without any sign that their implementation records will 
improve.  This situation could allow a similar problem to emerge with regard to the 
principles of Article 6(1).   
 
Implication 2a:  Member states can suffer numerous rulings against them in areas 
related to Article 6(1) without risking suspension of membership rights. 
 
When the member states have similar preferences to each other with regard to the 
principals outlined in Article 6(1), the agenda setting power of the most wayward 
member state does not have a great impact on the EU.  However, as the EU expands the 
likelihood that the range of preferences with regard to Article 6(1) will increase also 
expands.  It is certain that adding each new member state will not decrease the size of the 
core and may increase it (Tsebelis 1994).   
One might be inclined to believe that the principles set down in Article 6(1) are so 
basic that any member state government’s leaders would readily agree to them and have a 
similar practical definition in mind when doing so.  However, there are at least two 
reasons to believe that the expanding range of preferences will alter the practical 
definition of the principals set down in Article 6(1).  First, most of the states that have 
joined the EU since 2004 have only recently democratized and made the transition to 
  19market economies.  Article 6(1) requires adherence to the “rule of law.”  The newest 
member states may be less able to follow that principle as strictly as may the 15 
“Western” members.  Table 1 shows that level of corruption, as reported by Transparency 
International, among the members that joined since 2004 is far greater than is the case 
among the pre-expansion member states. Transparency International’s average corruption 
index for the 15 “Western” member states is 7.7.  The average for the 12 newest member 
states is 4.8.  A higher number indicates less perceived corruption and a lower number 
indicates more corruption.  The highest value observed among EU member states is 9.6 
(Finland) and the lowest value observed among EU member states is 3 (Romania).  
Among the member states that joined since 2004, not one has an index value higher than 
7 and only Estonia, Malta and Slovenia have values over 6.   
Second, the treatment of ethnic minorities is a major issue in several of the new 
member states.  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have significant Russian minorities whose 
treatment has been a matter of concern to the EU since before accession.  There are 
significant Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia.  Bulgaria has sizable Turkish 
and Roma minorities both of which have been subjected to official discrimination in the 
past.  Cyprus remains divided between its Greek and Turkish sides.  The government 
representing the Greek population has joined the EU despite the lack of a permanent 
resolution to the division of the island.  Table 1 shows the size of the largest ethnic group 
as a percentage of the population in each country.  It is interesting to note that even in 
countries with comparably homogeneous populations to Western member states, there is 
a history of ethnic conflict and official discrimination (Romania and Slovakia for 
example).  
  20Third, the newer member states may be more socially conservative than many of 
the older member states.  This is most certainly the case when one compares Poland to 
the Netherlands, or the Scandinavian members.  The Polish government’s position on 
issues such as the death penalty and abortion lie outside the range of the other member 
states or at an extreme end of that range.   
 
Implication 2b:  As range of permissible interpretations of Article 6(1) increases, 
member states may engage in policies that would have been considered violations 
of the principals outlined in Article 6(1) in the past.  
 
The analysis so far has concentrated on models that show several member states 
with differing opinions joining at once.  The next model I will examine depicts a situation 
where first one outlying member joins and then a second.  This situation might depict 
what would occur if Croatia and Turkey were to join at roughly the same time.  
Alternatively, it may be used to represent how the admission of Turkey would change the 
constraints currently being imposed on Poland’s nationalist/populist and Euro-skeptical 
government.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Figure 3 shows how even in a situation where the pre-expansion and some of the 
post-expansion member states have very similar ideal points, adding member states that 
are outside the original range of states can cause the minimum standard to shift in a less 
strict direction. Suppose the positions A through L represent the EU.  Member states D 
through L have identical ideal points with regard to the implementation of Article 6(1).  
  21The core spans from member states B’s position to that of members D – L.  In this 
situation member state K is the pivotal member that establishes the right most boundary 
of the core.  When member state M joins, the pivotal member is L instead of K but 
because members D through L have the same ideal point in this model, adding M does 
not expand the core.  Even though member state M might have significantly divergent 
preferences with regard to the implementation of Article 6(1), the positions of the other 
member states continue to enforce the same position as before M joined.  However, 
adding yet another member state, N, to the Union will dramatically increase the core.  In 
this situation, the pivotal member state changes from L to M.  Member state M can now 
implement its own ideal point without fear of sanction under Article 7.  Member state N 
can also implement a policy that approximates M’s ideal point.  If sanctions were to come 
up for a vote under Article 7, members M and N would cover for each other and prevent 
those sanctions from being imposed.   
 
Implication 3:  The addition of a single member state with dramatically different 
preferences for the interpretation of Article 6(1) can allow previously admitted 
member states to backslide. 
 
Again, Poland may provide an example in the making.  The Polish President, Lech 
Kaczynski, has called for the member states to reexamine the death penalty.  Currently 
abolition of the death penalty is a condition for membership.  Indeed, Turkish 
membership talks were publicly linked to the Turkish ban on the death penalty.  
Furthermore, the abolition of the death penalty is framed as a human rights issue falling 
  22under the scope of Article 6(1).  If Turkey joins the EU, it is not unreasonable imagine 
that populist governments would be in power in both Poland and Turkey at the same 
time.  Should such an event take place, they might take advantage of the situation to 
reinstate the death penalty.  The worst thing the Commission could do to such wayward 
governments would be to initiate a proceeding under Article 7 of the Treaty.  However, 
with two governments supporting an interpretation of Article 6(1) that allows for the use 
of capital punishment, no suspension of voting rights could be imposed.   
 
Implications for prospective and existing member states 
A major implication of this analysis is that candidate member states and existing 
member states both must consider the possibility of undoing reforms that were required 
in the accession treaty.  For the most demanding member state this amounts to a problem 
of reduced ex post oversight which could increase the costs and decrease the benefits of 
allowing the new member to join.  For the candidate member the situation implies that 
some of the most onerous and political costly changes imposed by the accession process 
can be undone at a later time – thus reducing the medium and long term costs joining the 
EU. 
The problem of ex post oversight is a serious one in the EU.  There is a sizable 
literature on policy implementation in the EU that focuses on the problems of oversight 
(c.f. Blom-Hansen 2005; Börzel 2000, 2001; Falkner et al 2005; Mastenbroek 2003; 
Sverdrup 2004; Talberg 2002; Treib 2007).  A common theme of this literature is that the 
member states have an enormous amount of autonomy from the EU with regard to 
implementing EU law.   The voting rules discussed above are a major source of this 
  23autonomy.  The result is that the EU as a supranational institution has limited ex post 
oversight capacity over the actions of the member states.   
Research on the implications of limited ex post oversight suggests that when ex post 
oversight is poor, the incentives to impose ex ante oversight increase (Huber and Shipan 
2002).  In the context of the models discussed above, the greater the potential for 
backsliding by a new member, the greater will be the emphasis on ex ante oversight in 
the accession treaty.  This follows from the observation that while the demands for 
membership are set by the most demanding member state, the standards for membership 
and implementation after accession are set at a significantly lower level.  At the same 
time, the models discussed above have shown that different circumstances involve 
varying risks of backsliding.  When a new member state’s preferences are within the 
existing range of the EU membership, there is little risk of backsliding.  Similarly, when a 
new member state joins alone and is the only outlier, there is little risk of backsliding.  
However, when a new member state joins as a block of similarly outlying members or 
when the new member can form a bloc with an existing outlying member, the risk of 
backsliding is high.   
 
Implication 4:  When the risk of backsliding by a new member state is high, the 
accession process and treaty will include stricter ex ante provisions and impose 
additional ex post mechanisms 
 
When the risk of backsliding is high, the most demanding member state and the 
Commission will have an incentive to include aggressive ex ante oversight mechanisms 
  24in the accession treaty.  There is superficial support for this implication already with 
regard to the 2004 and 2007 expansions.  Grabbe (2006) argues that the 2004 expansion 
placed higher requirements on the candidate member states than had been imposed on 
any previous candidates.  The accession treaties for Bulgaria and Romania are even 
stricter.  For these two member states, the Commission has set up a “mechanism for 
verification of cooperation and progress” with particular emphasis on issues relating to 
the rule of law.  Part Four, Title IV of the Protocol Concerning the Conditions and 
Arrangements for Admission of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European 
Union enacts a series of measures that dramatically change the ability of the Commission 
to act against Bulgaria and Romania in particular (Protocol Concerning the Conditions 
and Arrangements for Admission of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
European Union).   
Previous enlargements have allowed for a great deal of backsliding because of the 
position and size of the core.  However, the Protocol for Bulgaria and Romania identifies 
a number of circumstances under which the Commission can intervene directly in 
Bulgarian or Romania policies using a procedure that preserves the power of the highest 
demanding member state that was present during the accession process.  This passage of 
Article 38 is representative: 
…the Commission may, until the end of a period of up to three years after 
accession, upon the motivated request of a Member State or on its own initiative 
and after consulting the Member States adopt European regulations or decisions 
establishing appropriate measures and specify the conditions and modalities under 
these measures are put into effect (Protocol Concerning the Conditions and 
Arrangements for Admission of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
European Union:  41). 
 
  25This provision imposes an unprecedented ex post oversight constraint on Bulgaria 
and Romania for a three-year transition period.  This passage gives the Commission 
authority to make regulations directed at specific problems in Bulgaria and Romania 
without the approval of even a majority of the Council.  In effect, the Commission can 
impose regulations under the same circumstances that it could delay accession.  This 
unprecedented step is likely a response to the increased potential for backsliding that the 
2004 expansion has brought.  Furthermore, Bulgaria and Romania have similar problems 
to each other (i.e. poverty, sizable ethnic minorities with histories of being discriminated 
against, large share of the economy in agriculture, recently democratized, corruption etc).  
They are likely to fit the scenarios in which more than one outlier candidate state joins at 
the same time, enabling them to cover for each other with regard to Article 7.  For the 
period of the transition, the Commission can act without being constrained by the size of 




This article began with the question of whether Europeanization could be reversed.  
That is, do member states have the option of reversing some of the reforms they have 
undertaken to become EU members.  The analysis started by demonstrating that because 
of the unanimous vote required for admission to the EU, the initial standards to which 
entering member states are held are always high and if anything tend to increase.  
However, after membership the standards are established through a series of super 
majoritarian voting procedures.  In the case of infringements the supermajoritarian voting 
tends to maintain stricter standards than would simple majority voting.  However, in the 
  26case of human rights and the rule of law as set forth in Article 6(1) of the Treaty, the 
super majoritarian voting procedures in Article 7 allow a member state to undo EU 
mandated reforms to a great degree.   That is, member states can backslide with regard to 
Article 6(1).   
When all the member states have similar preferences about how to interpret Article 
6(1), the backsliding risk may not be great.  However, as the EU expands to include 
member states that are outliers on a wide range of dimensions including recent human 
rights records and issues relating to the rule of law, the risk increases.  Furthermore, the 
ability to backslide is not limited to the newest member states.  As new member states 
join and the core expands and shifts away from the preferences of the strictest members, 
even member states of long standing may take advantage of the situation to undo some of 
the costlier obligations of membership.   
The result of all of this is that there is a growing double standard between the 
standards that entering member states must meet and the standards that existing members 
must maintain.  This double standard is embedded in the institutions that form the 
foundation of the European Union.  Throughout its history, the EU has been based on 
consensus and the protection of minority interests.  This has been enforced by the super 
majoritarian voting procedures that are now the source of institutionalized double 
standards.  This double standard may complicate the decisions that candidate states make.  
On the one hand, they must convince reluctant constituencies that they will be treated 
fairly as members when there is evidence that they are not treated fairly as candidates.  
On the other hand, while the double standard may make joining more difficult, the 
prospect of being able to undo some of the reforms should make joining easier.   
  27The member states’ governments may benefit from this situation.  The ability to 
back away from some of the costlier obligations of membership without opting out makes 
membership more palatable to their constituents.  However, from the perspective of the 
EU’s supranational institutions and the more ardently pro-integration governments, the 
backsliding problem undermines the foundations of the Union itself.   
It is unlikely that the EU will resolve this problem.  The solution to the shifting core 
problem outlined above requires the imposition of even stricter supermajority 
requirements.  However, while this would certainly enable the Commission and the ECJ 
to impose ever stricter standards for implementation, it would introduce at least two other 
problems.  First, the imposition of stricter supermajorities might compensate for a 
shifting core but it would exacerbate the problems of associated with an expanding core 
as outlined in Tsebelis and Yataganas (2001) and König and Bräuninger (2004).  In 
particular, the ability to pass new legislation would decrease dramatically and the 
autonomy of the Commission and ECJ would dramatically increase.  Second, such an 
empowerment of the Commission and ECJ would encourage cries of a worsening 
democratic deficit.  Neither of these institutions is elected and freeing them from 
constraint by elected governments would be problematic. 
The solution to the potential for backsliding with regard to Article 6(1) is more 
straightforward if also unlikely.  If the voting rule in Article 7 were changed from 
unanimity to a simple majority, the risk of backsliding would be greatly reduced.  
However, such a move would require that the member states abandon the consensus 
approach that has been the foundation of EU voting from the beginning.  Furthermore, 
such a change would require a unanimous vote to implement and it is unlikely that those 
  28member state governments that stand to benefit from the unanimous voting rule in Article 
7 would willingly give up that advantage.   
In conclusion, this situation may indicate the limits of the EU’s expansion may be a 
function of its own institutional structure rather than questions of identity and what it is to 
be European.  That is, even states that would be widely acceptable under a set of strictly 
cultural criteria – Belorussia, Croatia, Serbia or Ukraine for instance – might be entirely 
unworkable from the institutional standpoint.  That is, their admission, particularly as a 
group, could destabilize the regulatory convergence that has already taken place within 
the EU.  Because admission is a unanimous decision, it would only take a single member 
state government to balk at the prospect to prevent accession.  At the same time because 
the standards for accession are high and likely to increase, such a candidate country 
might see the benefits of joining as not worth the trouble and withdraw their application 
or not apply at all.  These institutional features are likely a major component of the 
troubles plaguing Turkish application for admission.  Much of the popular debate about 
Turkish admission revolves around the fact that Turkey is Muslim however; the 
institutional impediments to a deal between the EU and Turkey are emerging already in 
the Bulgarian and Romanian accessions – both Christian societies.   
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TABLE 1:  Indicative Statistics for Recently Joined EU Member States 
 
Country PPP  Per 
Capita GDP 
(as % of EU 
average) 











8.5% 4.3%  NA  7.7*** 
Austria $35500 
(121%) 
4.9% 3%  91.1% 8.7 
Finland $32800 
(112%) 
7% 4.4%*  93.4%  9.6 
Sweden $31600 
(107%) 
5.6% 2%  NA  (87% 
Lutheran) 
9.2 
          
Bulgaria $10400  (35%)  9.6%  8.5%  83.9%  4 
Czech $21600  (73%)  8.4%  4.1% 90.4%  4.3 
Cyprus 
(Greek) 
$20300 (69%)  5.5%  7.4%  NA**  5.7 
Estonia $19600  (67%)  4.5%  11%  67.9%  6.4 
Hungary $17300  (59%)  7.4%  5.5%  92.3%  5 
Latvia $15400  (52%)  6.5%  13%  57.7%  4.2 
Lithuania $15100  (51%)  3.7%  15.8%  83.4%  4.8 
Malta $20300  (69%)  6.8%  3%  100%  6.6 
Poland $14100  (48%)  14.9%  16.1% 96.7%  3.4 
Romania $8800  (30%)  6.1%  31.6%  89.5%  3 
Slovakia $17700  (60%)  10.2%  5.8%  85.8%  4.3 
Slovenia $23400  (80%)  9.6%  4.8%  83.1%  6.1 
          
Cyprus 
(Turkish) 
$7,135 (24%)  5.6%  14.5%  NA**  5.7 
Croatia $13200  (45%)  17.2%  2.7%  89.6%  3.4 
Turkey $8,900  (30%)  10.2%  35.9%  80%  3.5 
* includes forestry 
** Cyprus is divided along ethnic lines. 
*** Average of the 15 “Western” member states 
(Source:  Economic and ethnic data are from CIA World Fact Book  
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html; Corruption index is from 
Transparency International 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005) 
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FIGURE 3:  The Effect of the accession of successive outliers to the Article 7 core 
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